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ment right to be informed. It was noted in the case that the Government, while not conceding the validity or propriety of the qualified
privilege granted Caldwell, did not seek review of the district court's
protective order due to the Justice Department guidelines issued subsequent to that order.]
Robert Thomas Barletta

LAw-NLRB's REMEDIAL PowERs-The United States Supreme
Court held that while the National Labor Relations Board does have
power under the Labor Management Relations Act to require employers and employees to negotiate, it is without power to compel a
company or a union to agree to any substantive contractual provision
of a collective bargaining agreement.
LABOR

H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U. S. 99 (1970).
Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,' provides:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment.., but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession....
On October 5, 1961, the United Steelworkers of America was certified by the NLRB as the bargaining representative of the approximately 300 production and maintenance employees of the H. K. Porter
Company's Danville, Virginia plant. As of September, 1964, the union
had sought and received one bargaining order against the employer 2
but no contract had yet been concluded between the parties. The three
unresolved issues as of this date were wages, health insurance and
"checkoff," the deduction by the employer of union dues from the
paychecks of employees who authorized such a deduction. The 300
employees comprising the bargaining unit lived within a radius of 35 to
40 miles of the plant. Since the union had no clerical staff in Danville
and its closest office was in Roanoke, approximately 85 miles away, it
1. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. 151 (1947).
2. H. K. Porter Co., 56 L.R.R.M. 1016 (1964).
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considered a checkoff as the only feasible means to obtain prompt and
regular collection of monthly dues.
In September, 1964, the union again initiated unfair labor practice
charges and the trial examiner, whose finding was adopted by the
Board in July, 1965, found that the company's rejection of the checkoff
was motivated by a desire to "frustrate agreement with the Union. ' 3 At
the hearing, the company's representative admitted that it made deductions from volunteering employees' wages for a variety of charitable
causes and that there would be no inconvenience involved in checking
off union dues; that, in fact, the company did check off union dues at
certain of its other plants and that the refusal to agree to a checkoff at
the Danville plant was solely on the ground that the company was not
going to aid and comfort the union at this location in the conduct of
union business.
In May, 1966, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
sustained the Board's unfair labor practice finding and affirmed the
Board's order to the company to cease and desist from the unfair labor
practice and to bargain collectively with the union upon request. 4 The
court indicated that the Board might possibly have required the company to agree to a checkoff provision as a remedy for the prior bad faith
bargaining, and concluded that although its order would not include a
specific reference to the company's obligation with respect to checkoff,
in view of the Board's finding that the company's refusal was for the
purpose of frustrating agreement "[t]o suggest that in further bargaining the company may refuse a checkoff for some other reason, not
heretofore advanced, makes a mockery of the collective bargaining
required by the statute."5
In the subsequent negotiations, the company and union each set
forth completely different interpretations of the court's decree. The
company held that the decree was merely yet another order that it
bargain in good faith, this time on the question of dues collection. The
company offered to discuss alternative arrangements for dues collection, but the union contended that the company was now obligated to
agree to a contractual dues checkoff provision.
In February, 1967, the union sought a clarification of the decree.
The motion for clarification was denied, but the court suggested that
the Board test the competing interpretations of the decree through its
3. H. K. Porter Co., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 119, 59 L.R.R.M. 1462 (1965).
4. H. K. Porter v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 851 (1966).
5. 363 F.2d 272, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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contempt process. In April, 1967, the union requested the Regional
Director to initiate contempt proceedings. In June the regional director responded and declined to prosecute a contempt charge, finding
that the employer had "satisfactorily complied with the affirmative
requirements of the order." The court of appeals then granted the
union's motion for clarification."
The court of appeals in a 2-1 decision stated that it did not read:
...Section 8(d) as prohibiting the Board from ordering a company, which has repeatedly flouted its Section 8(a)(5) duty, to
make meaningful and reasonable counteroffers, or indeed even
to make concession where such counteroffers or such a concession
would be the only way for the company to purge the stain of bad
faith that has already soiled its position.'
and concluded that:
Since the company had conceded that it had no business reason
for refusing the checkoff, it would have been perfectly proper for
the Board to order the company to grant one in return for a reasonable concession by the union on wages or insurance,-the two
issues besides checkoff that remained in dispute. Indeed, it is possible that in an appropriatecase the Board could simply order the
company to grant a checkoff. 8 (Emphasis Added.)
Taking its cue from the court, on remand the Board issued an order
directing the employer to grant the union's request for a checkoff provision without holding out for some "reasonable concession" in return. 9
Recognizing that this is the first time in the 35-year history of the
Act that the Board has ordered either an employer or a union to agree
to a substantive term of a collective bargaining agreement, Justice
Black, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court held that:
. . . while the Board does have power under the Labor Management Relations Act, . . . to require employers and employees to

negotiate, it is without power to compel a company or a union to
agree to any substantive contractual provision of a collective bargaining agreement. 10
After reviewing both the legislative and judicial history of the Na6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
Id. at 299.
Id.
172 N.L.R.B. No. 72, aff'd, 414 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102 (1970).
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tionai Labor Relations Act with respect to the Board's authority to
compel agreement to specific contractual provisions, the Court disposed
of the lower court's handling of the meaning of section 8(d) by noting
that:
We may agree with the Court of Appeals that as a matter of strict,
literal interpretation of that section it refers only to deciding when
a violation has occurred, but we do not agree that that observation
justifies the conclusion that the remedial powers of the Board are
not also limited by the same considerations that led Congress to
enact § 8(d). It is implicit in the entire structure of the Act that
the Board acts to oversee and referee the process of collective
bargaining, leaving the results of the contest to the bargaining
strengths of the parties. It would be anomalous indeed to hold
that while § 8(d) prohibits the Board from relying on a refusal to
agree as the sole evidence of bad faith bargaining, the Act permits the Board to compel agreement in that same dispute. The
Board's remedial powers under § 10 of the Act are broad, but they
are limited to carrying out the policies of the Act itself. One of
these fundamental policies is freedom of contract."
The Court, while noting that the Board's remedial powers under section 10(c) of the Act are broad, recognized that they are limited to
carrying out the policies of the Act itself and that one of these fundamental policies is freedom of contract. The Court further reasoned
that:
• . . allowing the Board to compel agreement when the parties
themselves are unable to do so would violate the fundamental
premise on which the Act is based-private bargaining under
governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without
any
12
official compulsion over the actual terms of the contract.

In concluding its decision the Court clearly stated its position with
respect to the proper source for answers to the Board's 8(a)(5) remedy
dilemma:
It may well be true; as the Court of Appeals felt, that the present
remedial powers of the Board are insufficiently broad to cope with
important labor problems. But it is the job of Congress, not the
Board or the courts, to decide when and if it is necessary to allow
governmental review of proposals for collective bargaining agree11.
12.

Id. at 107, 108.
Id. at 108.
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ments and compulsory submission to one 13side's demands. The
present Act does not envision such a process.
Justice Douglas, with whom Justice Stewart concurred, dissented.
Justice Douglas noted that section 10(c) of the Act empowers the Board
"to take such affirmative action .

as will effectuate the policies of the

Act" and concluded that:
In those narrow and specialized circumstances, I see no answer to
the power of the Board in its discretion to impose the checkoff
as 'affirmative action' necessary to remedy the flagrant refusal of
the employer to bargain in good faith.
But Jusice Douglas qualified this position by adding that:
...once there is any business consideration that leads to a denial
of a demand or any consideration of bargaining strategy that explains the refusal, the Board has no power to act. Its power is narrowly restricted to the clear case where the refusal is aimed solely
at avoidance of any agreement.' 4
In H. K. Porter the Board attempted to direct the inclusion of a
substantive contractual provision, checkoff, within a labor agreement.
The checkoff provision was one on which the parties themselves were
never able to reach agreement. In applying the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, the majority of the Supreme Court concluded that while the Board's remedial powers under section 10 of the
Act are broad, they are limited to carrying out the policies of the Act
itself, and one of these fundamental policies is freedom of contract.
That the freedom of contract allowed by the Act is not absolute is
obvious, however. For example, the Act does not leave the employer
free to choose any employee representative he wants, and the representative chosen by the majority of the employees represents the
minority as well. Also, by virtue of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(e) of the Act,
the freedom of the parties to contract with respect to union security
or "hot cargo" provisions is precisely delineated and limited. What
the Court is apparently saying therefore is that based on the legislative
history of the Act it was the clear intention of Congress to allow the
parties to bargain as freely as possible to arrive at a collective agreement and that the only encroachments of a substantive nature on this
freedom to bargain which the Court will recognize are those which
at 109.

13.

Id.

14.

Id. at 110, 111.
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are set forth in the Act itself. If the provisions of the Act are insufficient
to accomplish the purposes of the Act without further infringement
on the rights of the employer and the employee representative to bargain freely, these further infringements must be enacted by Congress.
Although the action taken by the Board in this case was clearly
beyond the scope of any previously prescribed 8(a)(5) remedy, it should
be noted that its order involved a lesser infringement upon the bargaining process than would be involved if it were to adopt either the
other alternative suggested by the court of appeals or the suggested
position of the minority of the Supreme Court. As an alternative to
simply ordering the company to grant a checkoff, the court of appeals
suggested that the Board might order the company to grant a checkoff
in return for a "reasonable concession" by the union on the other two
items still in dispute, wages and insurance. 15 In setting itself up as arbiter of what would be a "reasonable concession" with respect to an
item in dispute, the Board would have not only brought its presence
into the negotiating room but taken the chair at the head of the table
as well. The evaluation of the relative worth and merit of each party's
position would seem to be clearly beyond the authority and competence of the Board and would represent no less than government dictation of the terms of collective bargaining. Rather than promoting
the process of collective bargaining, it would destroy it. By contrast,
the Board's simple and clear order that the company should grant a
checkoff clause merely represented its opinion that the granting of this
clause was now the only way available for the company to absolve itself
of its 8(a)(5) violation. So too would the position of the minority of
the Supreme Court bring the presence of the Board squarely into the
negotiations of the parties for the minority would require the Board
to determine the existence of ". . . any business consideration that leads
to a denial of a demand or any consideration of bargaining strategy
that explains the refusal . . ." and only once such an existence is determined would the Board be powerless to compel one party or the
other to agree to an item in dispute. Since a negotiator for either party
would always be able to argue that it simply chose not to agree to a
specific substantive term in order to have it available as a bargaining
"carrot" for some future negotiation, the minority's suggested approach would either be doomed to failure from the start if applied
literally or would require a practical liberality in application by the
15.

See note 8.
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Board which would once again require the Board to superimpose its
own judgment on the relative merits of the positions taken by the employer and employee representative with respect to the item in dispute.
In order to appreciate the significance of H. K. Porter, it is useful
to briefly examine the manner in which it has been applied during its
short period of existence by the National Labor Relations Board. The
Board has applied H. K. Porter to the long pending Ex-Cell-O Corp.
case' 6 where the employer was found to have violated 8(a)(1) and (5)
of the Labor Management Relations Act by refusing to bargain with
a newly certified union and where the refusal admittedly was for the
purpose of obtaining court review of the employer's contention that
the representation election won by the union should have been set
aside and the certification of the union was therefore invalid. In addition to recommending the standard bargaining order as a remedy,
the trial examiner ordered the company to compensate its employees
for monetary losses incurred as a result of its unlawful conduct. In a
3-2 opinion the Board "reluctantly" reversed the compensation order
of the trial examiner while recognizing that its current remedies designed to cure violations of section 8(a)(5) are "inadequate." The
Board recognized that Ex-Cell-O was arguably distinguishable from
H. K. Porter in that in the former case the requested remedy merely
would require an employer to compensate employees for losses they
incurred as a consequence of their employer's failure to agree to a
contract he would have agreed to if he had bargained in good faith
while in the latter case the remedy operates prospectively to bind an
employer to a specific contractual term. 17 The Board majority found
such a distinction to be more illusory than real. In each situation the
employer is required by the Government to submit to demands of the
other side to which it never itself had freely asserted.
It would seem that there is considerably more merit to the order of
the trial examiner in Ex-Cell-O than there was to the Board's position
in H. K. Porter. In the Ex-Cell-O remedy there is far less infringement
upon the actual process of collective bargaining and the Board minority
cogently argues that in Ex-Cell-O the remedy would be designed to
compensate employees for the injuries caused to them by virtue of the
company's unfair labor practice, but it would not require the employer
to accept the measure of compensation as a term of any contract which
16.
17.
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Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 74 L.R.R.M. 1740 (1970).
74 L.R.R.M. 1740, 1743 (1970).
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might result from subsequent collective bargaining. According to the
Board minority, the Ex-Cell-O remedy does not "write a contract"
between the employer and the union, for it would not specify any new
or continuing terms of employment nor prohibit changing any existing
terms or conditions. While the minority's argument has a certain technical appeal, it appears to be clearly objectionable on at least two substantial grounds:
1. Any compensatory remedy established for the period during
which employees incurred losses because of the employer's unlawful
refusal to bargain would certainly serve as the springboard for further
union demands. It would be unreasonable to believe that a union
would eventually agree to terms that would provide fewer benefits to
the employees than were dictated by the Government as part of a
compensatory remedy; the Government is therefore dictating at least
the minimal terms of the subsequent agreement.
2. Since the National Labor Relations Act does not compel agreement but only compels that the parties bargain, the granting of a remedy
which presupposes that if the parties had bargained there would have
in fact been an agreement goes far beyond the obligation imposed oil
the parties by the act itself. Who is to say and by means of what standards that a collective labor agreement would have resulted from
bargaining in any specific situation?
It would appear that the current conflict concerning the Board's
remedial powers for 8(a)(5) violations has been stabilized for at least
the immediate future. On December 8, 1970, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case of Tiidee Products"' which involved the
issuance of a compensatory remedy similar to that involved in the ExCell-O case. Justice Stewart, who dissented in H. K. Porter,was of the
opinion that certiorari should be granted. 19
J. P. Kelly
18. Tiidee Products, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, - U.S. - (1970).
19. In closing, it should be noted that there are certain limits beyond which the holding in H. K. Porter clearly does not go. The case can be and should be distinguished from
a host of other decisions where the Board has been sustained in placing limitations upon
the general bargaining activities of the parties but where in each case the Board's activity
falls far short of dictating specific contract terms where the parties have themselves been
unable to agree to such terms. Such cases would include but not be limited to those which
hold that:
a. a party may not, pursuant to the express requirements of Section 8(d), refuse to
execute written contracts incorporating agreements already reached nor obviate
such agreements by delaying through litigation such execution until after the
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